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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Current Environment.
1. After the publication of Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202, the public press
began to tout the benefits of using family limited partnerships to achieve
significant reductions in the value of family-held assets for federal transfer
tax purposes.
a. The ability to reduce the value of otherwise liquid assets, such as
marketable securities, by allegedly as much as 40 to 50 percent,
seemed almost too good to be true.
b. Responsible estate planning attorneys had used family limited
partnerships for years to achieve many nontax objectives of their
clients, while at the same time achieving transfer tax savings
because of lack of marketability and minority interest discounts.
c. However, family limited partnerships have become almost a
panacea for every estate planning problem and are being used as a
death-bed planning technique to achieve purported significant tax
savings by establishing the entity months, and even days, before
the client's expected death.
2. Before the publication of Rev. Rul. 93-12, the Internal Revenue Service
(the Service) had sought both through the administrative process and by
legislation to restrict the ability to achieve a minority interest discount
when the entity was controlled by one family.
a. Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 CB 187, had disallowed a minority
interest discount in the case of a family-controlled corporation, but
the courts consistently rejected this position.
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b. In 1987, the Service was almost successful in statutorily
eliminating minority interest discounts in family-controlled entities,
but accepted I.R.C. § 2036(c) in its place.
(1) I.R.C. § 2036(c) was replaced in 1990 by Chapter 14.
c. With the plethora of family limited partnerships and LLCs being
created today solely, at least in the eyes of the Service, for transfer
tax avoidance purposes, the Service and the Treasury may go back
to Congress to seek a statutory solution.
d. In the meantime, the Service has stepped up its scrutiny of family
limited partnerships.
B. General Principles.
1. If there is to be a transfer tax, valuation is a key factor.
a. The tax will be determined by multiplying the tax rate times the
value of the asset being transferred.
b. The tax rate itself presents no conceptual problem.
c. The valuation of the assets to be taxed, however, can present a
problem.
d. Even in a case of marketable securities for which readily available
market quotations are available, a transfer of a significant block
may require a reduction in value because a significant number of
shares of one issuer may not be tradeable at the otherwise quoted
price.
e. In the case of nonmarketable assets, including interests in entities
that may hold marketable assets, there is even more difficulty in
arriving at the appropriate value for transfer tax purposes.
f. The Internal Revenue Code does not contain a definition of value
for transfer tax purposes, although it contains a number of special
rules that deal with.value, such as I.R.C. § 2032A, providing for
special valuation for real property used in a farm or closely-held
business, and the special valuation rules under Chapter 14.
g. However, the regulations do provide a definition of value, i.e., what
a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, neither being under
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any compulsion to buy or sell, and both having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
h. Trying to determine what a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller is not a simple matter, as demonstrated by the large number
of cases involving valuation issues.
2. While all would agree that value is a key element in a transfer tax system,
how value is determined can affect the integrity of the system or the
ability to pass a family-held business to the next generation.
a. It should be axiomatic that the transfer tax system should not
disfavor family-owned enterprises over publicly-owned enterprises.
(1) A share of stock in a publicly traded company has already
been discounted by the free market because of lack of
control.
(2) Such an interest is not entitled to a lack of marketability
discount since by definition it is marketable.
b. On the other hand, if an interest in a family-held business is
overvalued, the family will be paying more in transfer taxes than
the corresponding owner of a publicly traded business would be
paying for making the same transfer.
c. However, a family in control of a business has the ability to
exercise or fail to exercise rights in a way that serves to reduce the
value of interests held by older family members and to shift future
increases in value to younger family members.
d. This ability to shift value transfer tax-free from the older
generation to the younger generation may jeopardize the integrity
of the transfer tax system.
3. The attempt to balance the desire to maintain the integrity of the system
and the goal to treat family-controlled enterprises fairly creates the tension
between the Service and the taxpayer.
a. This tension has spilled over into areas that do not involve "family-
controlled enterprises," but rather family-owned investments, and
in particular, liquid investments such as marketable securities.
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4. The balance of this outline discusses some of the valuation issues that arise
when family limited partnerships and LLCs are used for estate planning
purposes.
a. There is a legitimate place for family limited partnerships and
LLCs in family planning, even in connection with the transfer of
liquid assets from one generation to another.
b. Even if the transfer tax system were eliminated tomorrow,
wealthier clients would still be well-advised to use family limited
partnerships and LLCs to achieve a number of nontax objectives.
II. VALUATION ISSUES: IN GENERAL
A. Introduction.
I1. One of the publicized benefits of using a limited partnership or LLC to
transfer wealth to younger family members is the potential reduction in the
value for transfer tax purposes of the assets being transferred because of
valuation discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability.
a. For example, if an older family member desires to transfer to a
younger family member ten percent of his or her IBM stock worth
$1,000,000, a direct transfer of the actual shares to the younger
family member or to a trust for his or her benefit would be a
taxable gift of $100,000.
b. If instead the older family member transferred the $1,000,000
worth of IBM stock to an LLC and received all the LLC interest
in exchange (assuming the LLC is formed in a state that recognizes
a single-member LLC) and he or she then gives a ten percent
interest in the LLC to the younger family member, the value of the
gift for gift tax purposes may be less than $100,000.
c. How much less will depend on the lack-of-control and lack-of-
marketability discounts a business appraiser would attribute to a ten
percent interest in an LLC owning IBM stock worth $1,000,000.
2. A lack of control discount, also referred to as a minority interest discount,
is appropriate when valuing an interest in an entity that does not give the
holder of the interest the right to decide when distributions of earnings will
be made, when the entity will be liquidated, and other issues that affect the
financial benefits of interest ownership.
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a. In an operating business, lack of control may also mean the interest
holder will not be assured of being an officer or employee of the
entity.
b. In the context of a family limited partnership or LLC, which
usually involves passive investments, the lost opportunity to be an
employee of the entity may not be important.
3. Until the Service issued Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202 in 1993, it had
taken the position that a lack of control or minority interest discount was
not appropriate in valuing an interest in an entity controlled by a family.
a. This position, which was originally set out in Rev. Rul. 81-253,
1981-2 C.B. 187, was rejected by the courts when challenged by
taxpayers. See, e.g., Propstra v. US., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1982); Est. of Bright v. US., 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Est. of
Andrews v. Comr., 79 T.C. 938 (1982).
b. In 1987, Congress considered a statutory provision disallowing
minority interest discounts when a family controlled the business.
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 657 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378.
(1) Ultimately, legislators chose to enact instead § 2036(c),
causing the value of a decedent's gross estate to include the
value of property transferred during life by a decedent
holding a substantial interest in a business, if such transfer
represented a disproportionate share of the potential
appreciation in the enterprise. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at
661, enacted by Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, § 10,402(a),
101 Stat. 1330-431 (1987).
(2) This anti-estate valuation freeze statute was subsequently
replaced in 1990 by the special valuation rules of Chapter
14 (I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704). Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI, §§
11,601-11,602, 104 Stat. 1388-490 (1990).
c. Although the proposal did not pass, the fact that Congress thought
a statutory fix was necessary to eliminate minority discounts in
family-controlled entities manifested its apparent belief that without
such a statutory provision, minority interest discounts would
otherwise be appropriate in family-controlled entities.
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4. In Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, which involved a gift by a 100
percent shareholder of a corporation of 20 percent of his stock to each of
his five children, the Service ruled that the family's control of the entity
would not be considered in valuing the 20 percent interests.
a. After Rev. Rul. 93-12 was issued, numerous articles appeared
touting the tremendous transfer tax savings available through the
use of family limited partnerships. See, e.g., S. Stacy Eastland,
Family Limited Partnerships: Transfer Tax Benefits, 7 Prob. &
Prop. 59 (1993); Alan S. Gassman and Matthew J. Schirmer, Real
Estate Tax Planning Tips After the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993, 39-8 Prac. Law. 17 (1993); John R. Jones, Jr., Family
Limited Partnerships Achieve Tax and Nontax Goals, 53 Tax'n for
Acct. 33 (1994).
b. The next year, however, the Service seemed to retract some of
what it had given when it ruled in a technical advice memorandum
(TAM) that a swing vote premium was applicable when valuing a
block of stock transferred to a family member if the block of stock
enabled the transferee to join with another related owner of an
interest in the entity to form a majority interest. TAM 9436005
(May 26, 1994).
(1) Under the facts in the TAM, the sole shareholder/taxpayer
had transferred a 30 percent block of stock to each of three
children, so that any two of the children could combine to
form a majority interest.
(2) The ruling was based on Estate of Winkler v. Comr.,
T.C.M. 1989, 231, in which the Tax Court found that a ten
percent block of voting stock had special characteristics that
enhanced its value when 40 percent of the stock was owned
by the transferor's family and 50 percent by members of
another family.
5. As will be discussed below, beginning in 1997 the Service began also to
challenge lack of control and lack of marketability discounts in situations
involving transfers just before the transferor died, particularly where the
transfers were carried out by persons acting in a fiduciary capacity on
behalf of the transferor. See Est. ofSchauerhamer v. Comr., T.C.M. 1997-
242; see also TAM 9736004 (June 6, 1997); TAM 9735003 (May 8,
1997); TAM 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997); TAM 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); TAM
9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); TAM 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
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a. It is likely that some of the taxpayers involved in the TAMs will
challenge the Service's position in court.
b. It is noteworthy that the Clinton administration's tax proposals for
fiscal year 1999 included a provision that would deny valuation
discounts for interests in a family-controlled entity for transfer tax
purposes to the extent that the entity held passive investments. The
Green Book, Feb. 1998, Department of the Treasury, p. 129; also
found in General Explanation of the Administration's Revenue
Proposals, Doc. 98-4793 Tax Notes Today 183 (Feb. 3, 1998).
6. A lack of marketability discount takes into account the fact that an owner
of an interest in a nonpublicly traded entity will have more difficulty than
an owner of a publicly traded entity in finding a willing buyer and, in
order to sell the interest, may incur expenses, such as legal, accounting,
and syndication fees.
a. The price of shares of stock or other publicly traded interests
already reflect a lack of control discount, but do not reflect a lack
of marketability discount because they are sold on a recognized
exchange and by definition are marketable.
b. However, there are situations in which publicly traded stock may
not be marketable in the hands of a particular holder because of
federal or state securities laws.
c. A business appraiser will often use the resulting reduction in value
of such restricted stock that is otherwise publicly traded as a
measure of the appropriate lack of marketability discount to apply
when valuing nonpublicly traded stock.
7. The flip side of a lack of control discount is a control- or swing-vote
premium.
a. In an operating business, a holder of a majority interest may be
able to derive greater financial benefits from the business than a
minority owner.
b. However, a majority interest in an entity in which the value of the
underlying assets exceeds the value of the entity as a going concern
should not be entitled to any premium.
(1) If the holder of the majority interest caused a liquidation of
the entity of his or her interest in the entity, he or she
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would be entitled to receive no more than his or her pro
rata share of the liquidation value of the assets of the entity.
(a) In this case, the fact that he or she controls the
timing -of the liquidation of the entity simply
eliminates the reason for a discount for lack of
control, but does not enhance the value of the
interest over its pro rata share of the value of the
underlying assets.
(2) The same analysis applies to an interest that could be
treated as representing a swing vote.
(a) The fact that the holder of such an interest could
combine with another owner to gain control of the
entity does not put that person in a better position
than a person who owns a majority interest to begin
with.
8. The following example illustrates the difference between the value of an
interest in an entity for which the going concern value is higher than the
liquidation value and an interest in an entity for which the opposite is true.
Assume there are two limited partnerships with the same liquidation value:
one owns an interest in an office building that has a fair market value of
$1,000,000 and the other owns a hardware store that could sell its assets
for $1,000,000. The office building produces an annual cash flow of
$50,000, after taking into account expenses, including interest and principal
payments. The hardware store produces $200,000 a year of cash flow. If
an investor is seeking a ten percent return on investment, he or she would
be willing to pay $50,000 for a ten percent interest in the office building,
even though ten percent of the underlying assets would be $100,000.
Absent any right to cause an immediate liquidation of the entity or to
redeem his or her interest for a pro rata share of the asset value, the
greater liquidation value of the office building is less important than its
going concern value to the purchase decision. Of course, the actual price
paid will also reflect the investor's expectations regarding the likelihood
that the entity would be liquidated, entitling him or her to ten percent of
the appreciated value of the office building. On the other hand, an
investor would not likely pay $200,000 for a ten percent interest in the
entity operating the hardware store, even though such an amount would
generate the desired return based on the store's cash flow. The actual
amount of discount applied would turn. on the minority owner's lack of
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control over liquidation and distribution decisions and the nonmarketability
of the interest.
9. In most estate planning situations involving real estate and other passive
investments, including marketable securities, the value of the underlying
assets are usually worth more than the value of the entity as a going
concern.
a. Therefore, a restriction on the right of an owner to cause a
liquidation of the entity or to have his or her interest redeemed at
a price equal to a pro rata share of the value of the entity's assets
will be important in ensuring that the interest is entitled to a lack
of control discount, assuming the restriction is not disregarded for
federal transfer tax purposes.
B. Valuing Interests Held in Specific Entities.
I1. Corporations.
a. The amount of valuation premium or lack of control discount
attributable to an interest in a corporate entity is directly related to
the percentage of voting stock one owns and the rights such a
percentage carries under state law.
(1) For example, the ownership of more than two-thirds of the
voting stock is worth more than the ownership of more than
50 percent of the voting stock if the owner of the former
but not the latter can cause a liquidation of the corporation
without the approval of other shareholders.
(2) Furthermore, the ownership of more than 50 percent of the
voting stock is worth more than the ownership of a lesser
amount if the owner can thereby control the election of the
corporation's board of directors.
b. If the value of the underlying assets of the corporation exceeds the
going concern value, there should be no premium applied to a
majority or controlling interest.
2. Limited Partnerships.
a. In the case of a limited partnership, valuation issues will differ for
general and limited partners.
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(1) An individual who owns only a limited partnership interest
will have no right to participate in the management of the
partnership, regardless of how much of an interest he or she
holds.
(a) For example, in a limited partnership with a one
percent general partner and a 99 percent limited
partner, the general partner has the sole legal right
to control the day-to-day affairs of the partnership.
(b) However, as a practical matter, if an individual
owned 99 percent of the partnership interests as a
limited partner, he or she may be in a position to
exercise effective control over the one percent
general partner.
(c) As the limited partner's percentage of the
partnership declines, his or her effective control may
also diminish.
(2) A limited partner in a limited partnership, depending upon
state law, may also not have a right to have his or her
interest redeemed until the end of the term of the limited
partnership as set forth in a certificate of limited
partnership.
(a) Setting such a term in the certificate of limited
partnership could therefore trigger a lack of control
discount for limited partnership interests.
(b) There is a possibility, though, that the Service could
view the term as an "applicable restriction" under
I.R.C. § 2704(b) (although this would be an extreme
expansion of the section's reach) and ignore it for
valuation purposes under Subtitle B of the Code.
(c) Some states have avoided this issue by specifically
depriving a limited partner of a right to withdraw
from the partnership, thereby ensuring that the
restriction will be factored into the limited
partnership interest's value. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(3)(B).
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b. A general partner may be entitled to have his or her interest
redeemed by the partnership at any time, although he or she may
be subject to liability for a premature withdrawal.
(1) However, in a family-controlled limited partnership, the
potential liability may be disregarded as an applicable
restriction under I.R.C. § 2704(b) for purposes of valuing
the general partnership interest.
(2) In partnerships with more than one general partner, any one
general partner would no longer have control, but would
still have the right to have his or her interest redeemed.
(3) If a general partner in a limited partnership also owns a
limited partnership interest, the issue arises as to whether he
or she can cause the partnership to redeem both his or her
general partnership interest and limited partnership interest.
3. LLCs.
a. In a member-managed limited liability company, a member will
have control under the default rule of most state LLC statutes if he
or she owns more than 50 percent of the membership interests
entitled to vote.
b. However, in most states voting and nonvoting membership interests
can be created so that nonvoting membership interests can be given
to younger family members to achieve the same lack of control
reduction in value achievable in a corporation through nonvoting
stock.
(1) Because the special valuation rule in I.R.C. § 2704(b)
applies only to liquidation rights, not voting rights, giving
nonvoting membership interests to younger family members
should depress the value of the membership interests for
transfer tax purposes.
c. Because in a manager-managed LLC, only the managers have a
right to participate in the management of the LLC, a non-member-
manager's interest in a manager-managed LLC should be worth
proportionately less than a member-manager's interest.
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C. Business Appraisals.
1. Regardless of the theoretical arguments that can be made for lack of
control and lack of marketability discounts, a professional business
appraisal should be obtained in every situation involving planning for
transfers of interests in a family-controlled entity.
a. It is highly unlikely that the lawyer preparing the operative
documents and otherwise advising the family will be a qualified
business appraiser.
b. In many cases the family's certified public accountant or other
financial advisor will also not be a qualified business appraiser.
2. If the Service challenges the valuation and there is no business appraisal,
the family may be forced to have the value of the interest determined
many years after the transfer took place and may be subject to penalties
in addition to gift taxes and interest.
a. Although there can be no guarantee that the appraisal will
withstand the scrutiny of a court, obtaining a professional business
appraisal will put the family in a better position to defend any
challenge by the Service to the lack of control and lack of
marketability discounts taken.
b. The latest version of I.R.S. Form 709, United States Gift
(and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, requires the
taxpayer to indicate whether a valuation discount has been applied
and to provide substantiation for the amount of the discount.
3. In some cases it will be necessary to obtain two appraisals, one for the
assets held by the entity, such as real estate, and one to determine the
value of an interest in the entity, which will depend upon a number of
factors, including the size of the interest, the operative agreements, and the
effect of state law on the rights of the owner.
D. Marketable Securities.
1. Assuming that the entity has been formed properly under state law, a
limited partnership (or an LLC taxed as a partnership) should be
recognized as a valid entity for transfer tax purposes even though the only
assets it holds are marketable securities.
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a. The family partnership rules under I.R.C. § 704(e) may disregard
for federal income tax purposes a partnership that is valid under
state law if certain criteria are not satisfied.
b. For transfer tax purposes, however, state law determines the
property rights that are being transferred unless a specific provision
in the Code mandates a different result. See, e.g., Comr. v. Est. of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), Aquilino v. US., 363 U.S. 509 (1960),
US. v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), Morgan v. Comr., 309 U.S. 78,
60 S.Ct. 424 (1940).
2. Congress recognized that a partnership owning only marketable securities
was valid for federal tax purposes when it amended I.R.C. § 731(c) in
1994 to address the tax treatment of partnership distributions of marketable
securities. Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. VII, § 741(a), 108 Stat. 5006 (1994).
a. Before its amendment, I.R.C. § 731 generally provided that a
partner did not recognize income when he or she received property
in kind as a distribution from a partnership; instead, his or her basis
in the distributed property was the lower of a partnership's basis for
the property or his or her basis in the partnership.
b. On the other hand, a partner did recognize income if cash was
distributed and the cash exceeded his or her basis in the
partnership.
c. Because marketable securities are now treated as cash when
distributed to a partner, a partner may recognize taxable income
when he or she receives marketable securities in a distribution.
I.R.C. § 731(c)(1)(A).
d. Marketable securities will not be treated as cash if the partnership
never held any assets other than marketable securities, indicating
that Congress recognized that a partnership that owned only
marketable securities was still a partnership for federal tax
purposes. I.R.C. § 731(c)(3)(C)(i). See also H.R. REP. NO. 103-
826(I), at 446 (1994), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773. ("It
is acknowledged that certain partnerships are formed for the
purpose of holding marketable securities for investment or for sale
to customers.")
3. In addition, the Code defmes a partnership as including a syndicate, group,
pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization through or by
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means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on.
I.R.C. § 761(a).
a. A partnership holding only marketable securities should qualify as
a financial operation.*
b. The Code allows an unincorporated organization to elect out of
partnership treatment if the only purpose of the entity is investment
and not the active conduct of a business. I.R.C. § 761(a).
c. Such an election would be unnecessary if an unincorporated
organization holding nothing but marketable securities could not be
treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes in the first place.
4. Estate of Winder v. Comr. suggests that the Tax Court may find that a
valid partnership exists for tax purposes, regardless of the type of assets
it holds. T.C.M. 1997-4.
a. In Winkler, parents and five children purchased lottery tickets from
time to time that were placed in a bowl in the family's home.
b. When a ticket purchased by the mother bore the winning number,
the family applied for the winning proceeds as a partnership.
c. Because state law required that the partnership have a written
agreement in order to receive the proceeds, the family went to an
attorney to have a written agreement prepared.
d. The agreement provided that the mother and father were each
entitled to 25 percent of any winning lottery proceeds and that the
five children were each entitled to ten percent.
e. The Tax Court held that a partnership existed for federal tax
purposes based on an analysis of the facts under the family
partnership rules and the broad definition of partnership that
appears in I.R.C. § 761(a).
5. Finally, Treasury Department regulations under I.R.C. §§ 701, 704, and
7701 include discussion of partnerships that are created solely for
investment purposes. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.701-1(a); 1.704-3(a)(3); and
1.761-2(a).
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E. The Service's Challenge.
1. The TAMs.
a. In 1997, the Service issued six TAMs in which it refused to
recognize family limited partnerships, and in one case an LLC, for
transfer tax purposes. TAM 9736004 (June 6, 1997); TAM
9735003 (May 8, 1997); TAM 9730004 (Apr. 3, 1997); TAM
9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); TAM 9723009 (Feb. 24, 1997); TAM
9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
(1) In the alternative, assuming that the entities were
recognized for transfer tax purposes, the TAMs held that
restrictions on transferability and liquidation would be
disregarded for valuation purposes under I.R.C. § 2703 and,
in five of the TAMs, I.R.C. § 2704(b).
(2) From the facts presented, it may be inferred that the Service
has chosen to focus on situations involving at least one of
the following three factors:
(a) Liquid assets, such as marketable securities, that
were transferred to a limited partnership or LLC;
(b) The transferor was elderly; or
(c) The transfer was carried out by third parties (such
as children) as agents under a power of attorney or
as trustees.
b. In each TAM, the Service claimed that the transaction should be
treated as a single testamentary transaction and therefore
disregarded for transfer tax purposes.
(1) It based its decisions on the Tax Court case of Estate of
Murphy v. Comr., T.C.M. 1990-472, in which the court held
that a minority interest discount was not applicable to stock
of a closely-held corporation although the decedent owned
less than 50 percent at her death.
(a) At the urging of her accountant, Mrs. Murphy had
transferred a 1.76 percent interest to her children 18
days before her death specifically to reduce her
interest below 50 percent.
jA:\lam\outlines\intrafam.va1
(b) In the TAM, the Service quoted the court's
statement that "[a] minority discount should not be
applied if the explicit purpose and effect of
fragmenting the control block of stock was solely to
reduce Federal tax." Citing Knetsch v. U.S., 364
U.S. 361, 367 (1960), Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465., 469 (1935).
(2) Understandably, the Service did not refer to the Estate of
Frank v. Comr., T.C.M. 1995-132, in which the Tax Court,
on seemingly similar facts, held that a transfer of stock by
the decedent's son acting under a power of attorney
reducing the decedent's ownership interest from just over 50
percent of the corporation to 32 percent two days before his
death was valid for transfer tax purposes, resulting in an
overall 45 percent combined discount for lack of
marketability and lack of control.
(a) The court in Frank stated that the motive for the
transfer was irrelevant to the question of inclusion
in the decedent's estate.
(b) Perhaps the facts in Frank can be distinguished
from the facts in Murphy.
(c) While in Frank there were no letters or other
written evidence that the purpose of the transfer was
to achieve a minority discount and a significant
block of stock was transferred, in Murphy there
were a number of letters from the family accountant
urging Mrs. Murphy to make the transfers in order
to obtain the minority interest discount at her death
and the amount of stock transferred was small.
c. The Service's second argument in support of its position in the
TAMs, which also would disregard the entity for transfer tax
purposes, was based on I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2).
(1) It viewed I.R.C. § 2703 as applying to the entity itself, and
not just to restrictions in an agreement or other document
affecting an interest in the entity.
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(2) As a result, it posited, a transfer of an interest in the entity
would be treated as a transfer of a fractional interest in the
underlying assets held by the entity.
(3) When applied to marketable securities, because the transfer
became a transfer of the marketable securities themselves
rather than an interest in the entity holding the securities,
the Service noted that a discount from the fair market value
of the marketable securities would not be appropriate.
(4) When applied to real estate, because the transfer became a
transfer of an undivided interest in the real estate, a
fractionalization discount would be appropriate.
d. In the event its position that the entity itself should be disregarded
is deemed by courts to be an incorrect reading of I.R.C. § 2703,
the Service argued that any restrictions on the right to transfer an
interest in the entity or to liquidate an interest in the entity would
be disregarded under I.R.C. § 2703 because the restrictions were a
device to transfer the interest to the objects of the decedent's
bounty for less than full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth.
(1) In other words, the restrictions did not satisfy the I.R.C.
§ 2703(b) exception to the general rule under I.R.C.
§ 2703(a) that the value of an interest in a partnership or
corporation be determined without regard to such
restrictions.
e. Finally, in all but one of the TAMs, the Service contended that
under I.R.C. § 2704(b) any limitations on the right to liquidate the
interests that were more restrictive than the state's default rule
would be disregarded.
f. The Service's position that the entity be disregarded under I.R.C.
§ 2703 ignores the language of the statute, the Committee Reports
indicating that Chapter 14 was not designed to eliminate minority
discounts, and the principle that federal transfer tax applies to
interests created under state law unless otherwise provided in the
Code. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964 (1990) at 1137.
(1) Consequently, while restrictions in the limited partnership
or LLC operating agreement may be disregarded for
valuation purposes under I.R.C. § 2703 if they do not
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satisfy the three requirements of the statutory exception, the
property interest should still be valued as a limited
partnership interest or LLC interest and not as an undivided
interest in the underlying assets.
(2) Whether I.R.C. § 2704(b) applies to cause restrictions on
liquidation to be disregarded in valuing the interest depends
upon state law. and how the Service defines an applicable
restriction.
(a) I.R.C. § 2704(b) can be avoided by forming the
limited partnership or LLC in a state that has a
default rule depriving a limited partner or a member
of an LLC of the right to withdraw.
2. Schauerhamer.
a. Like the six TAMs issued in 1997, Estate of Schauerhamer v.
Comr., T.C.M. 1997-242, involved family limited partnerships.
(1) The decedent formed a separate limited partnership with
each of her three children and transferred a substantial
percentage of her interests in the limited partnerships to
family members, using the annual exclusion to avoid
taxable gifts.
(2) Afterwards, she deposited income from the partnerships in
her personal account, in which she deposited income from
other sources, and used the account to pay her personal
expenses as well as partnership expenses.
(3) The Service once again argued that the limited partnership
interests should be disregarded based on its I.R.C. § 2703
analysis.
(4) However, the Tax Court decided that the transferred
interests should be included in the decedent's estate under
I.R.C. §§ 2036(a) and 2038 and decided the case in favor
of the Service without invoking I.R.C. § 2703.
(a) The Court found that there was an implied
agreement that the decedent would retain the
economic benefits of the property and, therefore,
because the decedent had transferred property and
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retained the right to enjoyment of the income from
the property until her death, the transferred limited
partnership interests were includible in her estate
under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
(b) The Schauerhamer case points out the importance of
complying with all the formalities under state law
and the terms of the operative agreements to ensure
that the entity will be recognized under state law
and the property transferred to the entity will not be
includible in the transferor's estate under I.R.C.
§§ 2036(a) and 2038.
III. SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
A. Introduction.
1. The special valuation rules contained in Chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code may apply to transactions involving family limited
partnerships and LLCs.
a. Congress enacted Chapter 14 in 1990 to replace § 2036(c), which
had been enacted in 1987 to prevent the use of estate valuation
freezing techniques that were perceived to be abusive. Pub. L. No.
101-508, tit. XI, §§ 11,601-11,602, 104 Stat. 1388-490 (1990); Pub.
L. No. 100-203, tit. X, § 10,402(a), 101 Stat. 1330-431 (1987).
(1) Under former I.R.C. § 2036(c), transferred property and
interests in property were brought back into the transferor's
estate if the transferor transferred a disproportionate share
of the future appreciation to younger family members and
retained rights to income or management.
(2) As interpreted by the Service, it potentially applied to
almost every conceivable arrangement for passing property
and interests in property to younger family members and
required complex calculations to determine the amount
ultimately included in the transferor's estate.
b. On the other hand, Chapter 14 applies special valuation rules to the
initial transfer and provides for adjustments in taxable gifts or
adjusted taxable gifts, either upon a later transfer of a retained
interest or at the death of the transferor.
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2. Although a detailed analysis of Chapter 14 is outside the scope of this
outline, the following discussion deals with its application to transactions
involving interests in family limited partnerships and LLCs.
a. I.R.C. § 2701 applies special valuation rules to certain transfers of
interests in corporations and partnerships (including LLCs treated
as partnerships for federal tax purposes) and I.R.C. § 2702 applies
special valuation rules to transfers of interests in trusts.
(1) Both sections have the effect of reducing or eliminating any
value of a retained interest in the entity and thereby
increasing the value of the transferred interest for gift tax
purposes.
b. I.R.C. §§ 2703 and 2704(b) increase the value of transferred
corporation or partnership interests by ignoring certain restrictions,
options, or rights associated with such interests when valuing them
for transfer tax purposes.
c. I.R.C. § 2704(a) treats lapses of voting and liquidation rights in
family-controlled corporations or partnerships as taxable transfers.
B. Transfers of Partnership and LLC Interests.
1. I.R.C. § 2701 ignores the value -of applicable retained interests in a
partnership or LLC for purposes of determining the value of subordinate
equity interests transferred to the transferor's spouse and descendants and
spouses of descendants of the transferor and the transferor's spouse. I.R.C.
§ 2701(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and (e)(1).
a. Applicable retained interests are certain senior equity interests (i.e.
equity interests that carry a preferred right to income or capital
distributions) retained by the transferor and the transferor's spouse
and ancestors and spouses of ancestors of the transferor or the
transferor's spouse. I.R.C. § 2701(a), (b), and (e)(2); Treas. Regs.
§ 25.2701-3(a)(2)(ii).
b. A senior equity interest is an applicable retained interest to the
extent it gives the holder (1) an extraordinay payment right or (2)
a distribution right (the right to receive distributions from the
entity) if the transferor or a member of the transferor's family
controls the entity. I.R.C. § 2701(c)(1)(A).
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(1) An extraordinary payment right is the right to put or call
the interest (i.e., to force the entity to purchase the interest
from the holder or to require the entity to sell an interest in
the entity to the holder), to convert the interest into a
subordinate equity interest, or to compel the liquidation of
the interest (essentially a put right). I.R.C. § 2701(b)(1)(B);
Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-2(b)(2).
(2) The transferor or a member of the transferor's family
(defined for this purposes as including descendants of the
parents of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, as well
as ancestors and spouses of ancestors of the transferor and
his or her spouse) (I.R.C. § 2701(b)(2)(C)) controls an
entity if any of them is a general partner in a limited
partnership (or presumably a member-manager in a
manager-managed LLC) or together they own 50 percent or
more of the equity interests in the entity. I.R.C.
§ 2701(b)(1), (b)(2).
(3) A distribution right does not include (i) a right to
distributions with respect to any interest that is junior to the
rights of the transferred interest, (ii) any liquidation, put,
call, or conversion right, or (iii) any right to receive any
I.R.C. § 707(c) guaranteed payment of a fixed amount.
I.R.C. § 2701(c)(1)(B).
c. However, the value of distribution rights which are qualified
payment rights are not ignored. I.R.C. § 2701(a)(3).
(1) A qualified payment right is the right to receive a fixed
amount or an amount based on a fixed interest rate from the
entity at least annually, or, if the amount is not paid in the
current year, to receive the accumulated unpaid amounts in
subsequent years before other equity interest holders receive
distributions from the entity. I.R.C. § 2701(c)(3), Treas.
Regs. § 25.2701-2(b)(6).
(a) A holder of cumulative preferred stock has a
qualified payment right.
(2) Although a qualified payment right is valued at fair market
value for purposes of determining the value of the initial
transfer unless it is combined with an extraordinary
payment right (Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-2(a)(4)), the entity's
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subsequent failure to pay the qualified payment on a timely
basis may result in an increase in the holder's taxable gifts
if he or she transfers a qualified payment right during life
or in the taxable estate if the right is held at death. Treas.
Regs. § 25.2701-4(a), and (c).
2. Certain payment rights fall outside the definition of distribution rights
completely and thus are not ignored in valuing the applicable retained
interest.
a. These rights include mandatory payment rights, liquidation
participation rights, rights to guaranteed payments of a fixed
amount under I.R.C. § 707(c), and nonlapsing conversion rights.
Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-2(a)(4).
b. A guaranteed payment right, which entitles the holder to receive a
fixed amount at a specified time, is also valued at fair market value
when determining the value of a transferred subordinate equity
interest. Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-2(b)(4)(iii).
(1) For example, an individual has a guaranteed payment right
if he or she is entitled to receive $2,000 a year from the
entity for his or her lifetime.
3. The effect of I.R.C. § 2701 is to reduce the value of interests older family
members continue to hold and increase the value of interests transferred
to younger family members by.,applying the subtraction method of
determining the value of a transferred interest when I.R.C. § 2701 applies.
a. Under this method, the value of any equity interests retained by the
older family members, disregarding applicable retained interests
and distribution rights that are not qualified payment rights, is
subtracted from the value of all family-held interests in the entity.
b. The remainder is the value assigned to the subordinate equity
interests and other equity interests held by the family in the entity.
Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-1(a)(2); See also Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-3
for specific methodology.
c. Because in most cases it is the subordinate equity interests that
have been transferred to younger family members, the amount of
taxable gifts by the older transferring family members is increased
by the same amount that the value of their retained equity interests
is reduced.
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4. Transfer tax savings may be obtained by transferring to younger family
members equity interests that will absorb the future growth in the entity's
value.
a. For example, an older family member starting a new business with
little initial value will incur a small taxable gift if he or she gives
all the residual interests to younger family members and retains a
senior equity interest that is valued at zero because it is not a
qualified payment right.
(1) Any subsequent increase in value will inure to the younger
family members without further gift tax consequences.
b. Likewise, a tax-free shift in value occurs if the value of a business
increases at a rate that exceeds the discount rate used in
determining the value of a qualified payment right or guaranteed
payment right retained by the older family member.
(1) Although the value of the qualified payment right or
guaranteed payment right will reduce the value of the
taxable gift, any payments actually made will be included
in the older family member's estate.
(2) In addition, any unpaid or late payments, compounded at
the discount rate used to value the qualified payment right,
will be included in the transferor's taxable gifts.
5. Nonetheless, in most situations the family can best achieve its tax and
nontax goals by avoiding the application of I.R.C. § 2701 altogether.
a. I.R.C. § 2701 is not operative if there is only one class of equity
interest in the entity, despite differences in voting rights, rights to
manage the entity, or exposure to liability. Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-
1 (c)(3).
b. Only one class of entity will exist if distributions of operating
revenue and liquidating proceeds are based on capital accounts and
the capital accounts are maintained in a manner that reflects the
financial investment of the owners in the enterprise from time to
time, taking into account profits retained in the entity and losses
allocated to the owners. Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-1(c)(3).
(1) For example, if Smith's capital account has a balance of
$10,000 and the capital account balances of all the owners
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is $100,000, Smith would receive ten percent of all
distributions.
(2) To reflect the owner's financial investment in the entity, an
owner's initial capital account should:
(a) Equal the fair market value of the owner's initial
capital contribution;
(b) Be increased by any additional capital contributions,
the owner's distributive share of the entity's profits,
and the amount of any of the entity's liabilities that
are assumed by the owner or that are secured by
property distributed to the owner by the entity; and
(c) Be decreased by the amount of cash and the fair
market value of any property distributed to the
owner, the owner's distributive share of the entity's
losses, and the amount of any liabilities of the
owner that are assumed by the entity or that are
secured by any property contributed by the owner to
the entity.
Treas. Regs. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv).
(3) If there are any gifts to the entity by a person who is not an
owner, the capital accounts of the owners should be
increased on a pro rata basis to reflect the fair market value
of the property.
(4) Finally, if an owner makes a nonpro-rata capital
contribution to the entity or the entity makes a nonpro-rata
distribution to an owner, the capital accounts of the owners
should be adjusted to reflect the then fair market value of
the assets held by the entity immediately before the capital
contribution or distribution. Treas. Regs. § 1.704-
1 (b)(2)(iv)(d)-(f).
(a) The capital account of the contributor or the
distributee is adjusted to reflect the fair market
value of the property contributed or distributed.
Treas. Regs. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b).
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6. If capital accounts are properly maintained, basing distributions on relative
capital account balances of the owners will ensure that only one class of
equity exists.
a. In this regard, the regulations under I.R.C. § 2701 state that special
allocations to satisfy specific requirements in subchapter K (the
partnership taxation rules), such as the special allocation rules of
I.R.C. §§ 704(b) and 704(c)(1)(A), will not create a second class
of equity. Treas. Regs. § 25.2701-1(c)(3).
b. In addition, such allocation of income, gain, loss, deduction and
credit items will eliminate several other potential tax problems.
(1) Allocation of tax items according to relative capital account
balances will avoid the complex rules under I.R.C. § 704(b)
dealing with the substantial economic effect of special
allocations of tax items.
(2) Also, the family partnership rules under I.R.C. § 704(e)
require that the allocation of a partnership's income must be
proportional to the capital interests, after allocating to a
donor partner reasonable compensation for services he or
she rendered to the partnership. Treas. Regs. § 1.704-
1 (e)(3).
(3) Finally, maintaining one class of equity interest will avoid
the possible triggering of a gift by an inadvertent lapse
under I.R.C. § 2704(a), which can occur if an older family
member loses the right to liquidate his or her retained
subordinate equity interest because of a transfer of a senior
equity interest to a younger family member.
C. Transfers of Interests in Trusts.
I1. I.R.C. § 2702 applies special valuation rules to transfers of interests in
trusts to, or for the benefit of, a member of the transferor's family where
the transferor or an applicable family member retains an interest in the
trust.
a. The value of any such retained interest is zero unless it is a
qualified interest, in which case its value is determined using 120
percent of the federal mid-term rate. I.R.C. §§ 2702(a)(2), 7520.
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b. Member of the family is defined in I.R.C. § 2704(c)(2) as the
transferor's spouse, any ancestor or lineal descendant of the
transferor or the transferor's spouse, any sibling of the transferor,
or any spouse of such ancestor, descendant or sibling. I.R.C.
§ 2702(e).
c. Applicable family member has the same definition for purposes of
I.R.C. § 2702 as it does -for I.R.C. § 2701, i.e., the transferor's
spouse, any ancestor of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, or
any spouse of such ancestor. I.R.C. § 2702(a)(1).
d. A qualified interest includes an interest consisting of the
irrevocable right to receive a fixed amount payable at least
annually (a "qualified annuity interest"). I.R.C. § 2702(b)(1);
Treas. Regs. § 25.2702-3(b), and (d).
(1) A trust in which the transferor has retained a qualified
annuity interest is referred to as a grantor retained annuity
trust, or GRAT.
2. I.R.C. § 2702 does not directly affect the transfers of interests in family
limited partnerships and LLCs.
a. In some cases, however, transferring limited partnership and LLC
interests to a GRAT may allow older family members to transfer
future growth in the value of the entity to younger family members
without incurring substantial gift tax if the value of the entity
increases at a rate in excess of the I.R.C. § 7520 interest rate used
to determine the value of the retained annuity interest for gift tax
purposes.
b. Additionally, if the value of the entity interest transferred to the
GRAT is discounted for lack of marketability and lack of control,
the value of the interest transferred to the trust by the grantor for
transfer tax purposes will be smaller than a pro rata share of the
value of the underlying assets; consequently, the value of the gift,
after reducing it by the value of the retained annuity interest, will
be lower than if the underlying assets had been transferred directly
to the GRAT.
(1) Note, however, that in at least one private letter ruling
(PLR) approving the terms of a GRAT, the taxpayer
represented that no discount was taken in connection with
j:\lam\outlines\itrafam.va1
the transfer of an interest in a limited partnership to the
GRAT. PLR 9707027.
(2) This representation may indicate that the Service took the
position that the transfer tax leveraging allowed through the
use of a GRAT may not be combined with lack of control
and lack of marketability discounts.
c. Example. Assume the sole owner of an LLC having a fair market
value of $4,000,000 transfers a 40 percent interest in the entity to
a GRAT, retaining the right to an annuity equal to eight percent of
the initial value of the assets in the trust, payable for 15 years.
Assume that 120 percent of the federal mid-term rate is eight
percent. Assume also that the value of the minority interest held
by the trust is $960,000, reflecting a 40 percent combined minority
and lack of marketability discount ($1,600,000 [40 percent of
$4,000,000] x 60 percent), and that the annual payment is $76,800.
Note that the annuity payment, which is eight percent of the
discounted value of the minority interest, represents only 4.8
percent of the actual, undiscounted value of the interest. Therefore,
any increase in the value of the LLC greater than 4.8 percent will
shift to the remainder beneficiary transfer-tax free. On the other
hand, if the interest held in trust were valued at its full pro rata
share of the fair market value of the LLC, the LLC would have to
increase in value at a rate greater than eight percent to achieve a
similar transfer-tax free shift in value. Consequently, more value
can be shifted tax-free to younger family members if the transfer
tax value of the property transferred to the GRAT can be
discounted for lack of control and lack of marketability.
D. Rights or Restrictions.
I1. Under I.R.C. § 2703, the value of any property is determined for transfer
tax purposes without regard to any right or restriction relating to the
property.
a. A superficial reading of the Committee Reports describing I.R.C.
§ 2703 could lead one to conclude this special valuation rule
applied only to buy-sell agreements. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-881
(1990), H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-964 (1990), both reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017.
b. In fact, it is directed at any option, agreement, or other right to
acquire or use the property at a price less than the fair market
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value of the property (determined without regard to the option,
agreement, or right) or any restriction on the right to sell or use the
property. I.R.C. § 2703(a).
c. Such rights or restrictions include restrictions on the owner's right
to require the entity to buy his or her interest at a reasonable price
or on the right to transfer the owner's interest to third parties
without unreasonable restrictions.
d. The Service has attempted to expand the reach of I.R.C. § 2703 by
arguing that the entity itself may be disregarded under I.R.C.
§ 2703, so that a transfer of an interest in the entity, either during
lifetime or at death, is treated as a transfer of an interest in the
underlying assets held by the entity. See TAM 9736004 (June 6,
1997); TAM 9735003 (May 8, 1997); TAM 9730004 (Apr. 3,
1997); TAM 9725002 (Mar. 3, 1997); TAM 9723009 (Feb. 24,
1997); and TAM 9719006 (Jan. 14, 1997).
(1) Accordingly, the Service would not apply a discount to a
transfer of an interest in an entity holding marketable
securities and would allow only a fractionalization discount,
presumably less than a combined lack of control and lack
of marketability discount, to a transfer of other kinds of
investments, such as real estate.
(2) Such a position disregards a fundamental precept of federal
transfer taxation, that state law determines property rights
that are includible in a decedent's estate. See, e._., Comr.
v. Est. of Bosch, 387,U.S. 456 (1967), Aquilino v. US., 363
U.S. 509 (1960), US. v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), Morgan
v. Comr., 309 U.S. 78, 60 S.Ct. 424 (1940).
(3) If the entity is valid under state law, the interest to be
valued for gift and estate tax purposes must be the interest
in the entity and not an interest in the assets of the entity.
2. There are two exceptions to I.R.C. § 2703, one statutory and one
regulatory.
a. Under the regulatory exception, a right or restriction on the
interest's value is not ignored if the family owns less than 50
percent of the value or voting rights in the entity. Tres. Regs.
§ 25.2703-1(b)(3).
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b. Under the statutory exception, a right or restriction that satisfies the
following three requirements will not be disregarded:
(1) The right or restriction is a bona fide business arrangement;
(2) The right or restriction is not a device to transfer the
property to the natural objects of the transferor's bounty for
less than full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth; and
(3) At the time the right or restriction is created, the terms of
the right or restriction are comparable to similar
arrangements entered into by persons in an arm's-length
transaction.
Treas. Regs. § 25.2703-1(b)(1).
c. Consequently, a restriction that is commercially reasonable should
not be disregarded when valuing an interest in a family-controlled
business.
E. Lapsing Voting and Liquidation Rights.
1. I.R.C. § 2704(a) treats the lapse of a voting or liquidation right as a
taxable transfer for gift, estate and generation-skipping transfer tax
purposes, but only if the individual holding such right and his or her
family controls the entity both before and after the lapse. I.R.C.
§ 2704(a)(1).
a. For purposes of I.R.C. § 2704, "member of the family" means the
individual's spouse, any ancestor or lineal descendant of the
individual or the individual's spouse, any sibling of the individual,
and any spouse of such ancestor, descendant or sibling. I.R.C.
§ 2704(c)(2).
b. Control is defined in the same manner as it is defined for purposes
of applying special valuation rules under I.R.C. § 2701. I.R.C.
§ 2704(c)(1).
2. The value of the deemed transfer is determined by valuing all interests
held immediately before the lapse by the individual, as if the lapsed voting
or liquidation right still existed, and subtracting the fair market value of
the same interests after the lapse (i.e., under normal valuation rules).
I.R.C. § 2704(a)(2).
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a. The pre-lapse value of the interests is measured immediately after
the lapse, but as if the lapsed voting or liquidation right still
existed, so as to take into account any loss in value attributable to
factors other than the lapse itself. Treas. Regs. § 25.2704-1(d), (f).
b. For example, if the lapse occurs because of the death of the holder
of the interest and the holder of the interest was a key employee,
the reduction in the value of the interest may be partially
attributable to the loss of the key employee and not entirely due to
the lapse of the voting or liquidation right. See Treas. Regs.
§ 25.2704-1(f), Example 1.
3. The application of I.R.C. § 2704(a) can be avoided if there are no lapsing
voting or liquidation rights to begin with.
a. However, depending upon the capital structure of the entity, a lapse
may occur when interests in the entity are transferred, even though
the voting and liquidation rights with respect to the transferred
interests do not lapse. I.R.C. § 2704(b).
b. Under the regulations, if an older family member transfers a senior
equity interest, such as a preferred partnership interest, to a
younger family member and as a result loses the right to liquidate
his or her retained subordinate equity interest, such as a residual
partnership interest, the lapse of the right will be treated as a
taxable transfer. Treas. Regs. § 25.2704-1(c)(1), (f), Examples 7
and 8.
c. This could occur, for example, if an older family member transfers
a frozen partnership interest that would be considered a senior
equity interest and retains a residual interest, and as a result
reduces his or her partnership interest below that amount required
to prevent a continuation of the partnership in the event of the
withdrawal of a general partner.
(1) The transferring older family member may be a general
partner in a limited partnership whose withdrawal from the
partnership would be treated as a dissolution event,
requiring the consent of all (or in some states a majority) of
the remaining partners to continue the limited partnership.
(2) If the limited partnership interest transferred by the older
member represented all his or her remaining limited
partnership interest or reduced the transferor's partnership
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interest below a majority interest, then he or she could,
depending upon state law, lose the right to cause a
liquidation of the partnership by withdrawing as a general
partner and voting not to continue the limited partnership.
(3) Consequently, the regulations would treat the transfer of the
limited partnership interest in this case as a lapse of the
general partner's right to liquidate.
4. In some cases, older family members may want to retain voting rights or
management rights while they are alive, but want the rights to lapse upon
their death so that younger family members receiving the interests pursuant
to the older family member's estate plan will not succeed to the voting or
management rights.
a. If the entity is structured with at least one other general partner or,
in the case of an LLC, member-manager, the decrease in the value
of the transferred interests at death because of the lapse of the
management or voting right may not be significant, since before
death the decedent did not have control as a result of the existence
of the other general partner or member-manager.
b. Whether there was a lapse of a liquidation right would depend on
whether the deceased general partner or member-manager also had
a right to liquidate his or her interests.
(1) In the case of an LLC, state law dictates whether the
withdrawal or death of a member causes a dissolution event
under its default rule.
(2) In the case of a limited partnership, if the partnership
agreement provided that the partnership would not dissolve
upon the withdrawal or death of a general partner if another
general partner remained, there would be no lapse of a right
to cause a dissolution under state law.
(a) However, a provision in the limited partnership
agreement providing for the continuation of the
limited patnership in the event of a general
partner's withdrawal if there is at least one other
general partner may be viewed as an applicable
restriction under I.R.C. § 2704(b), and as such
would be ignored for purposes of determining
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whether there has been a lapse of the right to
liquidate.
(b) Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA)
or the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(RULPA), most states require an affirmative
provision in the limited partnership agreement
regarding continuation in the event of a general
partner's withdrawal. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 29-344(4) (West 1998); Del. Code Ann. tit
6, § 17-801(3) (1997); N.Y. Partnership Law § 21-
801(d) (McKinney 1998).
(c) Such a provision would more closely resemble the
type of applicable restriction covered by I.R.C.
§ 2704(b).
(d) On the other hand, if under state law the default rule
is a continuation of the limited partnership in the
event of a withdrawal of a general partner when
there is at least one other general partner absent a
contrary provision in the limited partnership
agreement, I.R.C. § 2704(b) should not apply.
F. Applicable Restrictions.
1. Under I.R.C. § 2704(b), a restriction on the right of an owner to cause a
liquidation of the entity or of his or her interest in the entity will be
disregarded as an "applicable restriction" for purposes of determining the
value of an interest transferred toa member of the transferor's family if the
entity is controlled by the family before the transfer and the family can
remove the restriction, or the restriction will lapse, after the transfer.
a. However, a limitation on the right of an owner of an interest in an
entity to cause the entity to be liquidated or to have his or her
interest liquidated is not an applicable restriction if the limitation
is no more restrictive than the state's default rule. I.R.C.
§ 2704(b)(3)(B); Treas. Regs. § 25.2704-2(b).
b. Therefore, a restriction on the right of a limited partner or a
member of an LLC to withdraw from the entity and receive value
for his or her interest is not an applicable restriction if state law
does not give the limited partner or member such a right at all.
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(1) The fact that the family could override the state's default
rule and allow a limited partner or a member to withdraw
and receive value for his or her interest does not change
this result.
(2) If the regulations under I.R.C. § 2704(b) had provided that
an applicable restriction is any restriction that could be
overridden by the family regardless of the default rule
under the applicable state law, then the holder of shares in
a family-controlled corporation would be treated as having
the right to put his or her interest to the corporation and
receive fair market value for his or her interest, since the
family could always agree to such a transaction.
(3) Fortunately, the regulations, consonant with the policy
expressed in the Committee Reports that Chapter 14 was
not designed to eliminate minority interest discounts, look
to the state's default rule for purposes of determining
whether an applicable restriction exists. H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 101-964 (1990) at 1137.
2. A general partner in a general or limited partnership always has the right
to withdraw and receive value for his or her interest.
a. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, the withdrawal of a general
partner also causes the dissolution of the partnership, even though
the remaining partners can always agree to continue the business
of the former partnership by forming a new partnership. Unif.
Partnership Act § 801(1), Comment 1 (Supp. 1998).
b. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), in a
partnership that has a definite term or that is organized for a
specific undertaking, a majority of the remaining partners may
agree to continue the partnership after an event of dissolution, but
the general partner who withdraws is presumably still entitled to
receive value for his or her interest. See Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act
§ 801 (1985).
c. A general partner withdrawing from either a general or limited
partnership may be subject to liability for a premature withdrawal,
but the potential liability for a premature withdrawal would be
disregarded as an applicable restriction since it would not be
pursuant to the state's default rule but based on the terms of the
partnership agreement.
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3. If a general partner withdrawing from a limited partnership also owns a
limited partnership interest, he or she may also have the right to have his
or her limited partnership interest liquidated.
a. If under state law the withdrawing partner has the right to withhold
consent as a limited partner to the continuation of the limited
partnership even though it was his or her withdrawal that caused
the dissolution event, and state law requires the consent of all the
remaining partners to continue the partnership, he or she would
have a right to withhold consent and cause a dissolution of the
limited partnership.
(1) He or she would then bOentitled to receive value for his or
her limited partnership interest in addition to his or her
general partnership interest.
b. On the other hand, if only those limited partners holding a
majority-in-interest were required to consent to the continuation of
the limited partnership and the withdrawing general partner did not
hold a majority-in-interest of the limited partnership interests, then
he or she would not be able to cause a dissolution of the
partnership and would not be able to have his or her limited
partnership interest liquidated.
c. Also, if only the nonwithdrawing limited partners were required
under state law to consent to the continuation of the limited
partnership, a withdrawing general partner could not cause the
dissolution of the limited partnership because he or she would not
have the right to refuse consent.
d. Furthermore, in most states a limited partnership agreement may
provide that if there is more than one general partner, the
withdrawal of one of the general partners does not cause a
dissolution event.
(1) As discussed above, such a provision may be treated as an
applicable restriction and therefore disregarded for purposes
of valuing a limited partnership interest held by a general
partner at death.
(2) Consequently, the value of the deceased general partner's
limited partnership interest would presumably be based on
what he or she would have been entitled to receive under
state law if he or she withdrew from the limited partnership.
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4. The potential problems caused in a limited partnership by the right of a
general partner to withdraw at any time under state law is avoided in an
LLC formed in a state that does not give a member a right to withdraw
and has a default rule that provides for continuity of life.
a. In this situation, an interest in an LLC will have the same
characteristics as shares of stock in a corporation for purposes of
I.R.C. § 2704(b).
b. Under every state's corporation law, a shareholder has no right to
demand that the corporation redeem his or her stock and cannot
unilaterally cause a dissolution of the corporation, unless he or she
owns a certain percentage of the shares (in most states, more than
two-thirds). See, e.g., Ala. Code § 10-2B-14.02(f) (1997); Va.
Code Ann. § 13.1-742(E) (Michie 1997).
c. If a state's LLC statute requires unanimous consent to dissolve the
LLC, an interest in an LLC may be entitled to a larger discount
than shares in a corporation since dissolution of the LLC will be
less likely.
5. Although I.R.C. § 2704(b) may be avoided if the right entity is formed in
a state that denies a member the right to withdraw and provides continuity
of life as the default rule, the Service has taken the position that a
restriction on an owner's right to have his or her interest liquidated must
also pass muster under the I.R.C. § 2703 exceptions before it will be
factored into the valuation of the interest.
a. In other words, even though the restriction is not an applicable
restriction under I.R.C. § 2704(b), the restriction will still be
disregarded for transfer tax valuation purposes if it is not
commercially reasonable. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(3)(A). See. e.g., TAM
9736004, TAM 9730004, and TAM 9725002.
b. However, a solid argument can be made that in any closely-held
business entity, the owners do not give one another the right to
require the entity to redeem his or her interest at any time at a
value approaching the fair market value of the interest.
(1) Usually an owner has the right to have his or her interest
redeemed upon certain stated events and the value is not
necessarily based on the fair market value, but may be
based on the ability of the entity to pay for the redeeming
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owner's interest without jeopardizing the financial viability
of the entity.
(2) Unfortunately, the courts probably will have to decide what
restrictions are reasonable.
6. If someone other than a family member can prevent the withdrawal of
another member, the restriction will not be treated as an applicable
restriction under I.R.C. § 2704(b). Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b).
a. Therefore, another way of avoiding I.R.C. § 2704(b) would be to
add a nonfamily member, such as a charitable organization, as an
owner of the entity, and requiring the consent of all partners or
members in order for a partner or member to withdraw.
b. In the family-owned business context, adding a nonfamily member
as an owner may not be palatable.
7. It could be argued that an interest in a limited partnership or LLC should
be valued as an assignee's interest rather than an interest possessing all the
rights of a limited partner or member, because there is no certainty that a
transferee of the interest would be treated as a limited partner or member.
a. All states currently require the consent of some or all the other
owners before a transferee becomes a partner or member.
b. An assignee would have only the right to receive distributions that
the transferor would have received, but no other rights, such as any
right to have his or her interest liquidated.
IV. FRACTIONAL INTEREST DISCOUNTS
A. Introduction.
I . A fractional interest discount should reduce the value of an undivided
interest in an asset, such as real estate, that cannot be readily severed
without any loss in its value.
2. A fractional interest discount differs from a lack of control or minority
interest discount.
a. A lack of control or minority interest discount reflects the lack of
control an owner of an interest in an entity has over the day-to-day
decisions concerning the entity's activities or investments,
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distributions of cash or other property, and the liquidation of the
entity.
(1) The owner may hold less than a majority of the voting or
management rights or may be a limited partner in a limited
partnership or hold some similar type of ownership interest
that excludes the owner from participating in the decision-
making process.
b. A fractional interest discount reflects the lack of any mechanism
for making decisions, thus requiring unanimous agreement among
the owners to make any decisions, with the ultimate decision-maker
the court in a partition suit.
3. In early cases, like Propstta v. Com., 82-2 USTC 13,475, 680 F.2d. 1248
(CA-9), little or no empirical evidence was offered by either the Service
or the taxpayer to support a particular discount.
a. The Tax Court adopted a 15 percent discount as a compromise
between the Service's and the taxpayer's positions.
b. In Mooneyham v. Com., CCH Dec. 47,303(M), 61 T.C.M. 2445
(1991), Judge Cohen expressed her dissatisfaction with this
approach, but applied the 15 percent discount nonetheless.
B. Recent Developments.
1. The Service's Position.
a. In TAM 9336002, the Service ruled that the cost of partition was
the appropriate measure of the discount for an undivided interest.
(1) A partition could involve a physical partition, where the
property is actually divided into separate parcels and then
distributed to the owners, or a sale of the property, followed
by a distribution of the proceeds to the owners in
proportion to their ownership interests.
(2) Which form of partition is used depends upon whether the
real estate is capable of being evenly divided among the
owners so that each owner receives an interest of equivalent
value.
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(a) In most cases, because of the nature of the real
estate, a physical division is not possible; e.g., an
office building would be difficult to divide.
b. The costs involved in a partition suit vary from six percent to 12
percent of the value of the property, depending upon the state, and
the type of property involved.
2. Recent Tax Court Decisions.
a. LeFrak v. Com., CCH Dec. 49,396(M), 66 T.C.M. 11297 (1993).
(1) A 30 percent discount was applied.
(2) The court applied a combined 20 percent minority discount
and ten percent lack of marketability discount, after holding
that the transfers were transfers of fractional interests in real
estate and not partnership interests because of the
formalities in the case; i.e., the partnership was created after
the real estate was transferred to family members,
apparently to avoid local taxes on the transfer.
(3) The court also rejected the Service's position that no
discount was available because the owners were family
members, citing Propstra v. United States, Estate of Bright
v. United States, Estate of Andrews v. Com., and Estate of
Lee v. Com., 69, T.C. 860 (1978).
b. Cervin v. Com., CCH Dec. 50,219(M), 68, T.C.M. 1115 (1994).
(1) A 20 percent discount was applied.
(2) The court noted the partition would involve substantial legal
costs, appraisal fees, and delay, and any partition would
require an agreement among interest owners as to the
relative value of the land.
c. Barge v. Com., CCH Dec. 52,001(M), 73 T.C.M. 2615 (1997).
(1) A 26 percent discount was applied.
(2) The court determined the discount by taking into account
the delay a partition suit would involve, the present value
of the income that would be generated from the property
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during the delay, and the present value of the proceeds as
a result of the partition suit, and deducted from these
amounts the present value of the partition costs.
d. Williams v. Com., CCH Dec. 52,568(M), 75 T.C.M. 1758 (1998).
(1) A 44 percent discount was applied.
(2) The court adopted the taxpayer's contention that a 44
percent discount should be applied to value undivided one-
half interests in real estate that were gifted during the
decedent's lifetime and that passed at the decedent's death.
(3) The court rejected the Service's position that the expert for
the taxpayer should be disregarded because he was not a
real estate appraiser, noting that he was an experienced
business appraiser who had given expert opinions in valuing
fractional interests in partnerships, businesses, and real
property. The court noted that he had considered the time
and expense of selling the real property in that particular
market, and appropriately considered all relevant facts and
gave a reasonable explanation of the discount he applied to
the property interest at issue.
C. Analyzing the Fractional Interest Discount.
1. Factors supporting fractional interest discounts. See Hall, "The New
Paradigm: Life After the Elimination of Valuation Discounts," Vol. 76, No.
5, Taxes, 43, May 1998.
a. Owners of undivided interests have unlimited liability.
b. Undivided interests require unanimous consent for all decisions.
c. It is difficult to use an undivided interest as collateral for a loan
because creditors are reluctant to accept such an interest as
collateral.
d. Each owner has the right to use the property, subject to the rights
of the other owners, although profits, if any, are shared and
distributed in proportion to ownership interests.
e. Each owner has the right to sue for partition.
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2. Problems Associated with Partition Suits.
a. Usually a partition suit takes from two to five years, which would
discourage an investor who contemplated suing for a partition after
purchasing an interest.
b. There is no guaranty that the sale of the property would be at its
true fair market value.
c. The sale price may be affected by the fact that it is a court sale.
3. In 54 documented undivided interest transactions, one study found the
average discount to be 35 percent. Patchin, "Market Discounts for
Undivided Minority Interests in Real Estate," 3 Real Estate Issues 14
(Fall/Winter 1988).
4. In a more recent study, the average discount in 24 transactions was 47
percent. See Humphrey and Humphrey, "Unsyndicated Partial Interest
Discounts," The Appraisal Journal (July 1997).
V. ESTABLISHING THE VALUE OF A FAMILY-HELD BUSINESS FOR ESTATE TAX
PURPOSES
A. Introduction.
I1. The value of an asset for federal estate tax purposes is its fair market
value.
a. Fair market value is defined as the price a willing buyer would pay
a willing seller for the property or interest in property, both with
reasonable knowledge of the. relevant facts and neither under a
compulsion to sell or to buy. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).
2. Under the regulations and the case law developed before the adoption of
Chapter 14, the purchase price determined under a buy-sell agreement can
fix the value of an interest.in a closely-held business if the following four
requirements are satisfied:
a. The price must either be fixed or determinable pursuant to a
formula contained in the agreement.
b. The decedent's estate must be obligated to sell at death at the fixed
price.
j:\lam~outlinesXintrafam.val
(1) This can be accomplished either by giving the entity or the
other owners an option to buy the deceased owner's interest
or by using a mandatory buy-sell arrangement.
c. The restriction must apply during the deceased owner's lifetime.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h).
(1) At a minimum, the other owners must have a right of first
refusal to buy the interest at the fixed or determinable price
before the owner can sell the interest to a third party.
Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954).
(2) This requirement may not be satisfied if the owners may
transfer their interests to relatives or other owners by gift
during life unless the donees become subject to the same
restrictions.
d. The agreement must be a bona fide business arrangement and not
a device to pass the interest to the natural objects of the deceased
owner's bounty without full and adequate consideration in money
or money's worth. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h); Rev. Rul. 59-60,
Sec. 8, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
(1) This requirement should be met if the price under the
agreement is equal to the fair market value of the interest
at the time the agreement is originally executed.
3. In Rudolph v. U.S., 93-1 USTC 60,130 (S.D.IN., decided February 5,
1993), which dealt with a buy-sell agreement not subject to I.R.C. §2703
because it predated the effective date of that section, the district court
reviewed the fourth requirement in some detail.
a. In holding that the purchase price under the agreement controlled
the estate tax value of the shares in a family-owned business, the
court rejected the government's position that the fact that the price
under the agreement was below fair market value meant that the
agreement was a device to transfer the shares to the objects of the
decedent's bounty.
b. The court held that "the reasonableness of the price set forth in a
restrictive agreement should be evaluated based on the facts in
existence at the date the agreement is reached unless intervening
circumstances occur." ....
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c. In addition, intent to use the agreement as a testamentary
disposition must be present before the agreement is held invalid.
4. The owners may be tempted to set an artificially low price in the buy-sell
agreement in an attempt to reduce the federal estate tax of a deceased
owner, especially when the owners are related.
a. I.R.C. § 2703 should preclude related parties from depressing the
value through buy-sell agreements.
b. In the case of unrelated owners who may still attempt to depress
the value of an interest through a buy-sell agreement, the difference
between the price of the interest under the agreement and the fair
market value of the interest can be made up through the use of
group term life insurance under I.R.C. § 79, split-dollar insurance
arrangements, and death benefit only plans.
(1) The benefits under these plans may be arranged so that they
are not included in the deceased owner's estate, generally
through the use of irrevocable trusts in the case of
insurance arrangements.
(2) Nevertheless, there are problems with using an artificially
low price to reduce the estate tax value of the interest.
(a) The buy-sell agreement may not qualify as bona
fide.
(b) Because dispositions during lifetime must be made
at the lower price set out in the agreement if the
agreement is to be effective for establishing the
estate tax value, such a plan may not be acceptable
to owners who end up having to sell their interests
before death.
. ,
(c) As a result of the reduced value of the interest, the
estate may fail to qualify under I.R.C. §§ 303
(providing for sale or exchange treatment for certain
redemptions), 2032A (special use valuation for real
property used in farming or other small business),
2057 (exclusion for qualified family-owned business
interests), and 6166 (installment payments of the
estate tax attributable to small business interests).
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B. The Impact of Chapter 14 on Valuation.
1. I.R.C. § 2703, added by RRA 90, has a direct impact on the effectiveness
of a buy-sell agreement in establishing the value of an interest in family
controlled partnerships and corporations for estate tax purposes.
a. Although it could be argued that I.R.C. § 2703 does not change
existing law in a significant way, the new provision makes it clear
that the fourth requirement discussed above, i.e., that the agreement
must be a bona fide business arrangement and not a device to pass
the interest to the natural objects of the deceased owner's bounty
without full and adequate consideration, consists of two separate
requirements.
b. Consequently, merely because an agreement is a bona fide business
arrangement does not mean that it will establish the value for estate
tax purposes unless the agreement is not a device to pass stock or
a partnership interest to the natural objects of the deceased owner's
bounty without full and adequate consideration.
c. In addition, I.R.C. § 2703 adds a third requirement: the terms of
the buy-sell agreement must be comparable to similar arrangements
entered into in an arm's length transaction.
2. The general rule under I.R.C. §'2703 is that, for purposes of estate, gift,
and generation-skipping transfer taxes, the value of any property is
determined without regard to any right or restriction relating to the
property. I.R.C. § 2703(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a).
3. A right or restriction means:
a. Any option, agreement, or other right to acquire or use the property
at a price less than the fair market value (determined without
regard to the option, agreement or right); or
b. Any restriction on the right to sell or use such property.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(2).
(1) A right or restriction may be contained in a partnership
agreement, articles of incorporation, corporate bylaws,
shareholders' agreement, or any other agreement. A right
or restriction may be implicit in the capital structure of the
entity. Treas.-Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(3).
jAlam\outdinesintrafam.val
4. A lease will be disregarded in valuing property for federal gift, estate and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes if the terms are not comparable
to leases of similar property entered into among unrelated parties. Treas.
Reg. § 25.2703-1(d), Example 1.
5. A perpetual restriction on the use of real property that qualified for a
charitable deduction under either I.R.C. § 2522(d) or 2055(f) is not treated
as a right or restriction. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(a)(4).
C. Exceptions.
I1. Statutory exception.
a. A right or restriction will -not be disregarded if it satisfies the
following three requirements:
(1) The right or restriction is a bona fide business arrangement;
(2) The right or restriction is not a device to transfer the
property to members of the decedent's family for less than
full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth;
and
(3) The terms of the right or restriction are comparable to
similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms'
length transaction.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1).
b. The regulations make two changes to the statutory language.
(1) In the regulations, the second requirement refers to "objects
of the transferor's bounty" rather than "members of the
decedent's family." I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2).
(a) Thus the regulations make it clear that I.R.C. § 2703
applies for gift tax purposes as well as estate tax
purposes and expands the definition of members of
the transferor's family to objects of the transferor's
bounty.
(b) The Technical Corrections Bill, § 102(f)(12), would
have codified the change in the second requirement
from members of the decedent's family to the
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natural objects of the transferor's bounty; however,
the change was not part of the technical corrections
provision in the Small Business Act.
(2) The regulations add "at the time the right or restriction is
created" to the third requirement, making it clear that the
terms of the agreement are compared with similar
agreements at the time the agreement is entered into, not
when any rights conferred by the agreement are exercised,
such as at the death of the transferor.
c. Each of the three requirements must be independently satisfied for
a right or restriction to meet the exception.
(1) The mere showing that a right or restriction is a bona fide
business arrangement is not sufficient to establish the
absence of a device to transfer property for less than full
and adequate consideration.
(2) The treatment of the first two requirements as independent
codifies the holding in St. Louis County Bank v. U.S., 674
F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982) (accord, Estate of Lauder v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 977 (1990)), and reverses the
holding in Roth v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Mo. 1981).
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(2).
d. A right or restriction is treated as comparable to similar
arrangements entered into by persons in an arms' length transaction
if the right or restriction would have been obtained in a fair bargain
among unrelated parties in the same business dealing at arms'
length.
(1) A right or restriction is considered a fair bargain among
unrelated parties in the same business if it conforms with
the general practice of unrelated parties under negotiated
agreements in the same business.
(2) This determination will generally entail a consideration of
such factors as:
(a) The expected term of the agreement;
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(b) The current fair market value of the property;
(c) Anticipated changes in value during the term of the
agreement; and
(d) The adequacy of any consideration given in
exchange for the rights granted.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(i).
(3) Evidence of general business practice.
(a) Evidence of general business practice is not met by
showing isolated comparables.
(b) If more than one valuation method is commonly
used in a business, a right or restriction does not fail
to evidence general business practice merely
because it uses only one of the recognized methods.
(c) It is not necessary that the terms of a right or
restriction parallel the terms of any particular
agreement.
(d) If comparables are difficult to find because the
business is unique, comparables from similar
businesses may be used.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(4)(ii).
2. Regulatory exception.
a. A right or restriction is considered to meet each of the three
requirements if more than 50 percent by value of the property
subject to the right or restriction is owned directly or indirectly by
individuals who are not members of the transferor's family.
(1) Consequently, in such a case the agreement would have to
satisfy only the first three requirements under the case and
regulatory law before the adoption of Chapter 14; i.e., fixed
or formula price, restriction applicable during life, and
estate obligated to sell at death.
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b. In order to meet this exception, the property owned by the
unrelated parties must be subject to the right or restriction to the
same extent as property owned by the transferor.
c. Members of the transferor's family are the transferor, applicable
family members (the transferor's spouse, ancestors of the transferor
and transferor's spouse, and spouses of such ancestors) and any
lineal descendants of the parents of the transferor or the transferor's
spouse, and natural objects of the transferor's bounty.
(1) Any property held by a member of the transferor's family
under the indirect ownership rules applicable to I.R.C.
§ 2701 are treated as held only by a member of the
transferor's family.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(3).
3. If property is subject to more than one right or restriction, the failure of
a right or restriction to satisfy the three requirements described above does
not cause any other right or restriction to fail to satisfy those requirements
if the right or restriction otherwise meets those requirements.
a. Whether separate provisions are separate rights or restrictions, or
are integral parts of a single right or restriction, depends on all the
facts and circumstances.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(5).
4. According to the Senate Finance Committee Report at p. 68, I.R.C. § 2703
does not otherwise alter the requirements for giving weight to a buy-sell
agreement.
a. For example, it leaves intact present law rules requiring that an
agreement have lifetime restrictions in order to establish the value
of the business at death, that the price be fixed or determinable,
and that the estate be obligated to sell at the price determined
under the agreement.
D. Modifications of Buy-Sell Agreements.
I1. A right or restriction that is substantially modified is treated as a right or
restriction created on the date of modification.
j:\am\outfines\immafam.val
a. Section 2703 applies to a buy-sell agreement entered into before
October 9, 1990 if it is substantially modified after October 8,
1990.
b. Note that if a buy-sell agreement intended to satisfy the statutory
exception is substantially modified, the terms of the agreement
must be reviewed to determine whether they are comparable to
similar arrangements entered into by persons in an ann's length
transaction as of the date of the substantial modification.
2. The regulations provide some guidance as to what will be considered a
substantial modification.
a. Any discretionary modification of a right or restriction, whether or
not authorized by the terms of the agreement, that results in other
than a de minimis change to the quality, value, or timing of the
rights of any party with respect to property that is subject to the
right or restriction is a substantial modification.
b. If the terms of the right or restriction require periodic updating, the
failure to update is presumed to substantially modify the right or
restriction unless it can be shown that updating would not have
resulted in a substantial modification.
c. The addition of any family member as a party to a right or
restriction (including by reason of a transfer of property that
subjects the transferee family member to a right or restriction with
respect to the transferred property) is considered a substantial
modification unless:
(1) The addition is mandatory under the terms of the right or
restriction; or
(2) The added family member is assigned to a generation
(determined under the generation-skipping transfer tax rules
(I.R.C. § 2651)) no lower than the lowest generation
occupied by individuals already party to the right or
restriction.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(d),
Example 2.
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3. The following are not considered substantial modifications:
a. A modification required by the terms of a right or restriction;
b. A discretionary modification of the agreement conferring a right or
restriction if the modification does not change the right or
restriction (for example an amendment to change the company's
name or registered agent, Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(d), Example 3);
c. A modification of a capitalization rate used with respect to a right
or restriction if the rate is modified in a manner that bears a fixed
relationship to a specified market interest rate; and
d. A modification that results in an option price that more closely
approximates fair market value.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-1(c)(2).
E. Effective Dates.
1. Section 2703 applies to any right or restriction created or substantially
modified after October 8, 1990. Act § 11602(e)(1)(A) (ii)(II); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2703-2.
2. The final regulations were effective on January 28, 1992.
3. For transactions occurring before January 28, 1992, and for purposes of
determining whether an event occurring before January 28, 1992
constitutes a substantial modification, taxpayers may rely on any
reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions. The proposed
regulations and the final regulations are considered reasonable
interpretations of the statute. Treas. Reg. § 25.2703-2.
F. Planning.
1. Nonfamily-controlled corporations.
a. If more than 50 percent of a business is owned by nonfamily
members or persons who are not objects of the transferor's bounty,
the traditional rules applicable to establishing the estate tax value
of the business through the use of a buy-sell agreement should
apply.
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(1) In such a case, :there will be no requirement that the
agreement be a bona fide business arrangement and not a
testamentary device.
(2) The regulations should expand this exception to apply when
the same family owns no more than 50 percent of the
interests or when two or more unrelated persons each own
more than a de minimus interest in the business. In the real
world, two or more unrelated parties are not likely to agree
to a lower price for the business interest just to reduce
estate taxes, since the amount passing to his or her
beneficiaries would be reduced.
b. A buy-sell agreement among unrelated parties, or in cases where
no family controls the entity, may not be required to satisfy any of
the historical requirements in order for the value of the interest to
be determined by the price established under the agreement.
(1) If the parties were dealing at arm's length at the time the
agreement was executed, a court should be reluctant to
require the estate of a deceased owner to report for estate
tax purposes a value for the interest in excess of the
proceeds the estate receives in a sale pursuant to the buy-
sell agreement.
(2) However, in a case dealing with a nonfamily controlled
corporation, the court, in holding that the purchase price
established under a buy-sell agreement was the proper value
for estate tax purposes, did refer to the traditional test.
(a) The court stated:
As we pointed out in Estate of Bischoff v.
Commissioner [Dec. 34,702], 69 T.C. 32, 39 (1977),
it has long been recognized that a buy-sell
agreement in effect at the date of a decedent's death
may fix the value of the stock of a closely held
corporation if: (1) It is an enforceable agreement,
(2) it applied to the stock during the lifetime of the
decedent as well as at his death, and (3) it had a
bona fide business purpose rather than being
testamentary in nature. The fact that there is a
family relationship between the individuals to an
agreement does not cause such agreements always
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to be ignored, but the lack of such relationship has
been considered evidence of a lack of testamentary
intent by the agreement.
(b) The court found that because there was a business
purpose for the agreement and the price was at least
an arm's length negotiated price, the agreement was
reasonable at the time it was entered into.
(c) Note that in this case the purchase price under the
agreement for the decedent's stock (50 percent of
the total outstanding shares) was $107,073, whereas
one-half of the value of the assets received by the
remaining shareholder upon the liquidation of the
corporation two months later was $538,615.
Estate of Walon L. Carpenter, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1274 (1992).
2. Family-controlled businesses.
a. Modifications of buy-sell agreements entered into before October
9, 1990 should be carefully scrutinized to avoid losing the
grandfather protection; if the existing buy-sell agreement satisfies
the requirements applicable to such agreements before the effective
date of I.R.C. § 2703, the price determined under the agreement
will establish the value of the interest for estate tax purposes.
(1) If a family member becomes an owner after October 8,
1990, and adding him or her as a party to the agreement
would be considered a material modification, a separate
agreement with the new owner may avoid losing the
grandfather protection.
(2) It may also be advisable when entering into a buy-sell
agreement to include all family members currently alive as
parties to the agreement and to require in the agreement
that any after-born members of the family must become not
only parties to the agreement but also equity owners of the
business.
b. If a buy-sell agreement will have to satisfy the three requirements
under the statutory exception to I.R.C. § 2703 in order to establish
the value for estate tax purposes, the most difficult requirement to
satisfy in many cases will be the third requirement.
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(1) The third requirement states that, at the time the right or
restriction is created, the terms of the right or restriction
must be comparable to similar arrangements entered into by
persons in an arm's length transaction.
(2) This may require assembling evidence at the time the buy-
sell agreement is entered into.
(3) In comparing the Hall case (Hall Estate v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 312 (1989)) and the Cp~enter case with the St.
Louis County Bank v. U.S., 674 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982),
and Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. 977
(1990), it is obvious that a formula price under a buy-sell
agreement will not be effective for establishing the value
for estate tax purposes if:
(a) There is no evidence that an attempt was made to
arrive at a formula price based on objective
standards at the time the parties entered into the
agreement;
(b) The nature of the business changed considerably
since the original formula was established; or
(c) The agreement was not enforced with respect to
transfers occurring before the decedent's death.
c. In the case of a buy-sell agreement among parties that may be
disregarded for establishing the value of the business interest for
estate tax purposes, careful attention should be given to the source
of the payment of any estate tax on the value in excess of the
purchase price under the agreement.
(1) Also, the effect on the marital deduction should be
considered since the value for marital deduction purposes
may be reduced because of the buy-sell agreement, even
though the value for estate tax purposes disregards the buy-
sell agreement.
(2) In Technical Advice Memorandum (TAM) 9139001, a trust
designed to qualify for the marital deduction as a QTIP
trust was funded with shares subject to an option held by
the son to purchase the shares at book value. The IRS held
that since the son had a power to appoint the assets to
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someone other than the spouse (namely, himself) for less
than full and adequate consideration, the QTIP requirements
were not satisfied. See also TAM 9147065.
d. Note that an appraiser may value an interest in a closely-held
business not having a buy-sell agreement at a lower value than if
it had such an agreement because of the lack of marketability of
the interest and the uncertainty as to the future of the business
caused by the lack of such an agreement.
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